EZ break-up stands to benefit the core
April 2, 2012 10 Comments
I’ve argued elsewhere on this blog that the weaker countries in the EZ stand to benefit from abandoning the euro. Rather than undergo an endless process of retrenchment inside the single currency, they could grow much faster following a nominal devaluation outside the euro area. This would not just benefit the peripheral countries, however. The core countries stand to gain from weaker countries abandoning the common currency as well.
The core countries have two main courses of action they could pursue instead of the current approach of buying time with bailouts, LTROs and firewalls for the periphery. The first option would be to pull the plug on the weaker countries, cutting off their funding and letting them fend for themselves. This would be a disaster for all parties, causing the crisis to spread like wildfire to the core. It is clearly not on the table. The second alternative would be for the core countries to keep the peripheral countries on life support indefinitely, effectively turning the core-periphery relationship into an endless unhappy marriage.
To maintain such an unhappy marriage, the EZ’s core countries would need to agree either to unlimited fiscal subsidies for the weaker countries through joint and several liabilities (such as Eurobonds) or to fiscal transfers. But Eurobonds can only emerge once political union and a pooling of assets have been achieved in the EZ. This is a long-term process, and there is very little chance that EZ leaders could achieve this in the timeframe necessary to keep the weaker countries in the common currency area. More likely, the EZ’s unhappy marriage of core and periphery would involve creating a fiscal transfer union. This is an extremely risky and expensive venture, however.
Weaker countries would be disincentivised to undergo the difficult and painful task of rebalancing their economies if they knew they could turn to the wealthier EZ countries for hand-outs instead. Transfers to the weaker countries are already vehemently opposed in the stronger, wealthier countries of the core. Furthermore, if the core countries were to provide all of the weaker EZ countries with unlimited fiscal transfers, the core countries’ own balance sheets would become impaired and they would end up requiring bailouts themselves.
While the introduction of Eurobonds is too long-term a project to be completed in time to prevent the exit of some weaker countries from the EZ, such exits from the periphery would make it easier for the remaining core countries to create joint and several liabilities.
The EZ’s core countries do not trust in the fiscal responsibility of their peripheral counterparts. This was highlighted by the agreement of the fiscal compact, an initiative spearheaded by Germany to impose limits on the fiscal imbalances EZ member states are allowed to accrue. EZ leaders touted the fiscal compact as an early step towards fiscal union, but at the time of its agreement it represented nothing of the sort. It was an attempt to get the weaker EZ countries to mimic Germany’s fiscal dynamic, thereby placing the entire onus for adjustment onto the periphery and ensuring that drastic fiscal adjustment would drive the EZ’s weaker countries deeper into recession.
Given Germany’s obsessive insistence on fiscal responsibility as a pillar of the EZ, the exit of weaker countries from the common currency area could provide the impetus for the stronger countries to move towards creating a true fiscal union. Currently the core countries are unwilling to pool liabilities with the weaker countries because of concerns that they will be subsidizing those countries forever and will therefore see their borrowing costs rise. But if the EZ loses its weaker members, the smaller EZ that would result would consist of countries with a greater reputation for fiscal responsibility. Such a change in the profile of the membership might lead the strongest, wealthiest countries to become less opposed to issuing Eurobonds and to finally take the necessary steps to establish a fiscal union. The result could be a smaller but much stronger currency area.
Meaningful piece. Exiting the EZ might be the only option left to peripheral countries to grow and compete. Fiscal transfers could create at best a dependence mechanism which would not reduce core-periphery gap. Historical evidence from the Italian Mezzogiorno shows that government subsidies to the Southern regions activated a local demand, which were used to consume goods produced in the Northern regions. This way the Mezzogiorno remained a follower of the North and failed to catch up over the past 50 years. One possibility for peripheral regions to restore economic growth could be factor movements. However, labor and capital mobility across EZ is too low to create a structural adjustment through this way. In addition, heterogeneity in fundamentals (i.e. institutions, regulation, policies, etc.) did not reduce over the past decades. Absence of convergence in output per capita across EZ regions due to heterogeneity in institutions has been documented elsewhere (http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0264999309001163). Therefore, it is highly unrealistic to expect productivity convergence within EZ in the coming years, that is poor regions growing faster the rich ones, ceteris paribus. The remaining choice seems to be related to an increase in competitiveness through an external devaluation, which would imply abandoning the EZ. I guess you agree on that and this is what you actually suggest. In contrast, I don’t see much incentives for strongest countries to use Eurobonds to finance poor countries being outside the currency area.
Hello,
I do not any any real value in playing with pieces of paper.
The split of the euro might have some value in the short term, but absolutely nothing in the long term.
Look at the experience of Spain. Because of the structural problems of competitiveness, the peseta was devaluated in 1959, 1967, 1984, five times between 1992-96. As these problems have not been resolved but the peseta cannot be devaluated now.
The issue of Spain is lack of internal competition. Among worker class (labour market) and enterprises (too much regulations that protect the established against the new). More or less like Italy, except that the government of Monti seems be more decided.
The experience of Spain is that in the long term, currency devaluation does not help at all, because it removes the incentives for structural reforms.
Our major fear (in Greece) regarding a potential exit from the euro zone, is that we will end up with a useless currency (the new drachma) which we will not even have enough time to print (a canadian firm says that one year is needed if everything runs very fast)
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I’ve commented before on Economonitor that the Euro is a busted flush.
The endless summits,meetings etc have done absolutely nothing to solve the deep rooted problems.
Bailouts and severe austerity resulting in mass unemployment,wage cuts and dire social conditions do not encourage the growth needed to pay off these and other debts.
It will raise its ugly head again,and sooner rather than later. Mr Roubini makes a sound case for fixing the woes in his latest blog. Will they follow some,any,or all of it?
Of course they won’t! They’ll plod on regardless,more bailouts,deeper austerity.
If the eurozone was an animal a vet would have put it to sleep months ago!
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http://www.webofdebt.com/articles/greeceanderuo.php
Megan what are your thoughts about some of the ideas put out by Ellen Brown in the above article, like having Greece keep the Euro but also print drachmas to finance day to day operations?
I think this will probably happen anyhow, in the short- to medium-term at least until all the scrip and euros can be replaced by drachma.